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CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE BELATED DEMISE OF A
VAGRANCY STATUTE
Papachristouv. Jacksonville,405 U.S. 156 (1972)
Eight defendants were convicted in municipal court of violating the
vagrancy ordinance of the city of Jacksonville.1 Their convictions were
affirmed by the circuit court in a consolidated appeal, and the First District
Court of Appeal dismissed their petition for writ of certiorari. 2 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, reversing the convictions, HELD,
the Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness.3 Thus, for the first
time in its history the Supreme Court held a vagrancy statute unconstitutional. 4
The crime of vagrancy originated in 14th century England, with the passage of the Statutes of Laborers.5 These statutes made the act of wandering a
crime," since they required the laboring population to dwell in designated
areas and to work for specified wages. 7 In the ensuing years, however, the
law of vagrancy underwent considerable change. Vagrancy statutes were
utilized not only to control the wandering unemployed but also to curb

1. 405 U.S. 156 n.1 (1972), citing JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE §26-57 (1965), which provides: "Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common
night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd wanton and
lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object,
habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the
earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction
in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses." Class D
offenses at the time of the convictions were punishable by 90 days imprisonment, $500
fine, or both.
2. Brown v. Jacksonville, 236 So. 2d 141 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970). The district court
denied certiorari on the authority of Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1967), which
held Florida's vagrancy statute constitutional.
3. 405 U.S. 156 n.2 (1972).
4. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 801 (1969).
5. 23 Edw. 3 c. 1 (1349); 25 Edw. 3 c. 1 (1350). See 3 R. STEPHEN, HISroRY OF Ta
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 203 (1883).
6. 3 R. STEPHEN, supra note 5, at 267. The definition of "vagrant" at common law was
"a person who wandered about from place to place, who had no lawful or visible means
of support, and who did not work though able to do so." Prince v. State, 36 Ala. App.
529, 530, 59 So. 2d 878, 879 (1952).
7. Due to far-reaching social and economic changes in England as well as to the
advent of the Black Plague in 1349, which created an acute labor shortage, a free class
of laborers arose that was able to exact high wages for work and would wander from town
to town in search of better employment. As an adjunct to this free class of laborers the
pauper, one who cannot or will not maintain himself, became a problem. The Statutes of
Laborers were enacted to cope with these wandering laborers. See 2 W. HOLDswORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

459-60 (1936).
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the activities of probable criminals." The conduct of wandering, therefore,
was no longer required for violation of the law, but the mere status of pauper
or vagabond became criminal. 9
Although in the 19th century the English law of vagrancy shifted from
the status criminality concept back to a requirement of criminal conduct, 0 the
earlier concept had been firmly established in the new American states.'
Due to a belief that paupers and unemployed wanderers were potential
criminals, 12 American vagrancy laws punished individuals because of their
status or present condition.'3 In addition, the laws were expanded to cover a
4
host of new acts.'

Florida's vagrancy statute' and municipal ordinances resembling it6
have been called "anachronistic survivors of a bygone era.' 7 Florida's statute
was previously declared unconstitutionally vague and overbroad by a threejudge federal district court.' s This decision, however, was not binding on

8. Note, Vagrancy- A Study in Constitutional Obsolescence, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 384,
389-90 (1970).
9. Id. at 391. For an extensive discussion of the concept of status criminality in
vagrancy law see Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of
Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 102 (1962).
10. In the 17th century England began to take a more humanitarian view of the poor
and criminal vagrancy law was separated from poor relief legislation. Vagrancy law shifted
from punishing status to punishing specific criminal acts. These changes were reflected in
the Vagrancy Act of 1824. See Note, supra note 8, at 391.
11. Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 256 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out the obvious incongruity of transplanting an English antimigratory law to America, a country that invited and required vast migrations of emigrants.
Id. at 256.
12. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
13. Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 256 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
14. Id.
15. FLA. STAT. §856.02 (1971): "Rogues and vagabonds, idle or dissolute persons who
go about begging, common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays,
common pipers and fiddlers, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers, traders in stolen
property, lewd wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers
and brawlers, persons who neglect their calling or employment or regular income and
who have not sufficient property to sustain them and misspend what they earn without
providing for themselves or the support of their families, persons wandering or strolling
around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, idle and
disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their
time by frequenting houses of ill fame or gaming houses, persons able to work but
habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children, and all able
bodied male persons over the age of eighteen years who are without means of support and
remain in idleness, shall be deemed vagrants, and upon conviction shall be subject to
the penalty provided in §856.03."
16. See, e.g, DAYTONA BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §29-16 (1971); JAcKSONVIL.,
FLA., CODE §26-57 (1965); NEW SMYRNA BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §16-43 (1958);
ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE

17.
18.

§25.73 (1963);

TAMPA, FLA., CODE

§26-83 (1970).

Note, supra note 8, at 392.
Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
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state courts, 9 and Florida's vagrancy statute has been held constitutional by
20
the Florida supreme court.
In the instant case the United States Supreme Court held Jacksonville's
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague on its face and therefore
violative of procedural due process as required by the fourteenth amendment.
The concept of vagueness of a penal statute rests on the constitutional
principle that procedural due process requires both fair notice of prohibited
conduct and proper standards for administrative and judicial enforcement.21
The underlying principle of the fair notice requirement is that no man should
be held criminally liable for conduct that he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed. 22 The instant Court found the terms used in the
Jacksonville ordinance were so "general and all-inclusive" as to be vague 23
and, therefore, failed to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that
his conduct was forbidden.24
The ordinance was also found to be lacking in proper standards for
administrative and judicial enforcement.25 This shortcoming also resulted from
the use of vague terms to describe the criminal offense. Vagueness appears
to be a common vice of vagrancy statutes, which is due not- to inadvertence
but to a purposeful design. 26 Relieved from the tight restraints of definitive
standards, the police have wide discretion in the application of the statutes.
In fact, the express purpose of vagrancy law is not the punishment of offenders
but the protection of the public by prevention of crime.2 7 Vagrancy statutes
19 Brown v. Jacksonville, 236 So. 2d 141, 142 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
20. Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1967). The vagrancy conviction of Johnson
was later overturned by the United States Supreme Court due to lack of evidence, but the
Court never reached the merits of the constitutionality of FLA. STAT. §856.02 (1971). Johnson
v. State, 391 U.S. 595 (1968). The holding of the Florida supreme court in Johnson was
later affirmed in Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1970).
21. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
22. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
23. The Court held the following terms were unconstitutionally vague: "common night
walkers," "habitual loafers," "persons able to work but habitually living on the earnings of
their wives or minor children," and "persons wandering or strolling around from place to
place without any lawful purpose or object." 405 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1972).
24. Id. at 162. The Court cited as authority the case of Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451 (1939), in which a vagrancy type statute that punished persons who were members of a gang was challenged. The United States Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutionally vague in that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application." Id. at 453. This "men of common intelligence"
test, first stated in Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), emphasizes precise
notice to the layman himself. While in the past it has appeared that the Court was withdrawing from the strictness of this test, the present case indicates the test still influences the
Court's decisions. See Note, supra note 9, at 122 n.116.
25. 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
26. Id. at 166. The phrase quoted by the Court and often cited by other courts when
referring to this purposeful vagueness first appeared in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
540 (1948): "Definiteness is designedly avoided so as to allow the net to be cast at large,
to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of the police and
prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense."
27. M. BASSIOUNI, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 143 (1969). For other purposes or
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are used to arrest and detain "suspicious" persons whom the police, in their
discretion, believe have committed or will commit crimes.2 S While in the
absence of a warrant police may arrest an individual only upon probable
cause, 29 the vagueness of the vagrancy law allows police, under color of legal
right, to arrest an individual for suspicion only. 30 In the instant case the
Court found the lack of definitive standards in the Jacksonville ordinance
gave police too much discretion in applying the vagrancy law. This "unfettered discretion" encouraged erratic, arbitrary, and discriminatory enforcement3 1 Due to the lack of ascertainable standards of guilt, the police,
as well as judges and juries, are likely to rely on criteria outside the statute
32
in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
The instant Court held the ordinance violated procedural due process
because it failed to give fair warning and lacked ascertainable standards of
guilt. Due process, however, is a multifaceted concept and its requirement of
reasonableness is reflected not only in questions of fair notice, but of overbreadth, excessive use of the police power, and equal protection, all of which
are intimately related. 3 While the Court explicitly decided the instant case
on fair notice and proper standards grounds, it implicitly expressed its
opinion as to these other due process aspects as well.
The Court intimated but did not hold that the ordinance, due to its
vagueness, was overbroad. Under procedural due process the danger of overbreadth in a penal statute is that constitutionally protected conduct may be
stifled. People, rather than risking prosecution, will abstain from conduct
that is apparently proscribed by the statute.3 4 The Court observed the ordinance was broad enough to prohibit a number of activities, which are not
only innocent by modern standards but are actually part of the very amenities
of life for which Americans strive.35 While not expressly guaranteed by the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights, the Court implied that such amenities
were part of the rights or freedoms that the state had no business controlling.6

functions for which vagrancy statutes are used see Note, The Vagrancy Statute: To Be or Not
To Be?, 15 S.D.L. REV. 351 (1970); Note, supra note 8, at 412.

28. This sub rosa use of vagrancy law is discussed in Comment, Vagrancy-Loitering
Laws: An Antithesis to Recent JurisprudentialTrends, 35 TENN. L. REV. 617, 625 (1968).
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. XIV, §1; see Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971).
30. See Note, Vagrancy and Related Offenses, 4 HARV. Civ. LIB.-Civ. RiGHTS L. REv. 291,
295 (1969); Note, supra note 9, at 129.
31. 405 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1972).
32. See Note, Vagrancy and Related Offenses, 4 HARV Civ. Liv.-Civ. RIGHTs L. REv. 291,
296 (1969).
33. See Note, supra note 8, at 401.
34. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV.67, 76 (1960).
35. The activities that the Court considered "amenities of life" are nightwalking,
loafing, strolling, living off the earnings of one's wife or children, and other activities proscribed by the ordinance. 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
36. Id. at 165.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss1/11

4

1972]

Gatton: Constitutional Law: The Belated Demise of a Vagrancy Statute
CASE COMMENTS

Thus, through dicta, the Court seems to have returned to the concept of sub37
stantive due process and under a new guise.
Intimately connected with the lack of adequate standards and the resulting discretion vested in police, another vice of the ordinance was the
opportunity afforded for denial of equal protection of the law. The Court
apparently rejected the causal connection between the vagrant status as
defined in the ordinance and future criminal conduct as a presumption "too
precarious for a rule of law." 38 Without this causal relationship, the Court
recognized the possibility that police would enforce the ordinance discriminatively against the poor, minority groups, and undesirables. 39 Moreover, there was some indication that the Court believed racial discrimination
40
influenced some of the arrests in the instant case.
Conspicuously absent from the Court's opinion was the concept of vagrancy as a status crime. 41 Vagrancy normally does not involve an act or
omission, but condemns the passive act of merely "being." 42 The Supreme
Court recently invalidated a penal statute that criminalized the status of a
drug addict 43 and questioned the validity of another statute that made alcoholism a crime. 44 There was at least some indication that vagrancy statutes
might suffer from the same defect4 5 but the Court did not discuss this issue.

37. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Supreme Court
held that the right of privacy fell within the "penumbra" emanating from a number of
constitutionally protected rights and was, therefore, protected from infringement by
the state. While the Court openly rejected its earlier concept of substantive due process,
Mr. Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, pointed out that the Court was actually
returning to the natural law due process philosophy to strike down a state law. Id. at 522.
38. 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972). One authority believes there is "little correlation between
pauperism and serious criminality," and indicates that the police themselves arrest vagrants not as a means for suppressing future criminality but in an attempt to solve past
crimes. See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603,

627-28 (1956). Another author, however, believes it is not unreasonable to believe that a
vagrant, a person who has no visible means of support, will turn to criminal conduct
to survive. See Comment, supra note 28, at 622-23.
39. 405 U S. 156, 169 (1972). See Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966)
(Douglas, J., dissenting), where Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that vagrancy laws do not
reach the idle rich but just the idle poor, and to make idle pauperism a crime is to encourage convictions of unpopular minorities. Id. at 257. For a brief discussion on selective
enforcement of vagrancy laws, especially against Blacks, see Note, supra note 9, at 131-33.
40. In the statement of the facts of the instant case Mr. Justice Douglas noted that
defendants Papchristou and Calloway were white females and their companions when
arrested, Melton and Johnson, were black males. The arresting officer denied the racial
mixture played a part in the arrest of the foursome. 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972).
41.

See generally Note, supra note 9.

42. See Note, supra note 8, at 392.
43. Robinson v California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (statute held invalid as cruel and unusual punishment).
44. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 554 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
45. See Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 257 (1966) (Douglas J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Douglas stated he could "not see how economic or social status can be made a
crime any more than being a drug addict can be." Id. at 257.
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The effect of the present decision is not limited to Jacksonville's ordinance, but touches Florida's vagrancy statute 46 and the many similar municipal ordinances. 47 In Smith v. Florida,- decided by the Supreme Court the
same day as the instant case, the judgment of the Florida supreme court upholding Florida's vagrancy statute was vacated and remanded in light of
the instant decision. Thus, the Court made clear that section 856.02 of the
Florida statutes suffered from the same flaws as the Jacksonville ordinance.
Florida, therefore, is without a valid vagrancy statute. While the instant
Court found the Jacksonville ordinance too vague, it did not set any guidelines for a vagrancy law that would meet constitutional standards. Thus, it is
an appropriate time to reconsider the necessity of a vagrancy law and what
valid function it may serve.
Vagrancy laws are widely used by the police to justify arresting, searching,
questioning, and detaining persons whom they suspect have committed or
may commit crimes. These functions, however, are fulfilled in large part by
the stop-and-frisk law recently enacted by the Florida Legislature. 49 Those
aspects of vagrancy that are properly the subject of regulation can be regulated through individual and narrowly drawn criminal statutes.90 Furthermore, the elimination of vagrancy statutes would lighten considerably the
burden on the state's judicial machinery. As the Court in the instant case
pointed out, over 100,000 arrests were made in 1970 for vagrancy alone.51
The Florida Legislature has the opportunity to rid itself of archaic feudal
laws that have no place in our modern society. Indeed, it seems somewhat
anomalous that Florida, while encouraging people from all over the nation
to sojourn to its cities and resorts for vacations, also makes idleness and
loafing a crime. 52 History should provide a beacon to guide us in the solution
of our present problems, not a light that blinds us so that we ignore present
realities.
ROBERT

D. GATTON

46. FLA. STAT. §856.02 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Codes cited note 16 supra.
48. 405 U.S. 156, 172 (1972). In Smith two defendants were convicted of vagrancy for
being "persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object." The Florida supreme court rejected challenges of vagueness and overbreadth and held FLA. STAT. §856.02 (1971) to be constitutional. Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d
250 (Fla. 1970).
49. FLA. STAT. §901.151 (1971).
50. See Note, supra note 8, at 414-15.
51. 405 U.S. 156, 169 n.15 (1972).
52. See Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1931).
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